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Abstract  
The significant increase in the number of applications that 
depend on Internet of Things concept is becoming more 
evident. It has been deployed in many areas in smart homes, 
smart cities and health monitoring applications. The means to 
secure these applications are slower than our growing 
dependence on them. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate 
the kinds of vulnerabilities that exist in home monitoring smart 
cameras and to demonstrate their effects on users’ security and 
privacy, by proposing a threat model and a security and privacy 
analysis framework. The framework covers five major 
components of the smart camera system with a set of designed 
test cases. The framework is applied to five commodity smart 
cameras. Range of vulnerabilities are discovered with respect 
to the framework. The vulnerabilities discovered indicate that 
IoT devices continue to be shipped by vendors without putting 
enough effort on their security and with insufficient regard for 
the implications that they have on users’ privacy. The work 
reported here has been part of the first author’s MSc thesis [1].  
 
Introduction   
The Internet of things (IoT) phenomenon has received much 
attention in recent years due to its attractive nature of bringing 
convenience to people’s lives and the promise of making 
various appliances smart. The significant increase in the 
number of applications that depend on this concept is 
becoming more evident. The IoT has inspired many possible 
applications and has been deployed in areas such as smart 
homes, smart cities, health monitoring applications, etc. [2]. 
The means to secure these applications are appearing more 
slowly than our growing dependence on them; more thoughts 
are put into the usability of such devices and less on their 
security. 
This motivates us to propose an analysis framework 
for commodity devices such as IoT smart cameras. Smart 
cameras for home monitoring have been widely used and have 
been deployed by different manufacturers. Users utilise these 
smart cameras while away from home to monitor their home.  
 
These cameras that are used for personal use of either indoor 
or outdoor security often endanger the lives or property of the 
people using them. Security and privacy are often overlooked, 
or come as afterthoughts. Alternatively, they may be applied as 
an extra layer after development. To ensure that IoT products 
do not compromise users’ security and privacy, the UK 
government released a draft code of practise that guides 
manufacturers to ensure that security in these products is built 
in by design [3].  
Threat Model and Smart-Camera Analysis Framework  
First, we will define the context of the smart-camera system. 
The camera monitors its surroundings and sends notifications 
to the user’s associated smartphone application whenever an 
event is detected. The user can also login into his or her account 
through the application and watch video streams of the camera. 
The camera sends the video to the user’s application either 
directly or through a server. We examined associated Android 
apps as the most common case. Additional details are 
described below.  
Some of the assets (AS) that need to be protected in smart-
camera systems are the following:  
AS1. The video stream data. Videos can capture users’ 
faces, behaviours, gestures, and many other types 
of identifiable information. These streams are 
transmitted from the camera to the Android 
application either directly or through the server.  
AS2. Personally Identifiable Information (PII) like 
telephone numbers, a user’s full name, home 
address and so on.  
AS3. The smart camera which is the main physical asset 
of the system  
A complete threat and risk analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, four types of threats are considered to create 
a smart-camera analysis framework that can be further 
extended.  
These types of threats (TH) are as follows:  
TH1. Unauthorised video stream retrieval: The attacker 
can retrieve a video stream by capturing the traffic 
exchanged between the smart camera and other 
destinations.  
TH2. Tampering with the smart camera: The attacker can 
gather information about the device, reset it, access 
the device system’s logs, or remove external 
storage.  
TH3. Unauthorised account hijacking: The attacker can 
brute-force access the user’s account passwords.  
TH4. Unauthorised capture of PII data: The reckless 
design of the Android application can endanger 
personal data.  
The first and fourth threats represent a breach of user 
confidentiality and privacy, while the second and third threats 
compromise the availability of the smart camera as well as user 
confidentiality.  
Figure 1 shows the components of the smart-camera 
system: the smart camera and its associated gadgets, a smart 
phone with a smart-camera associated application installed on 
it, the web interface for the smart camera, the servers that the 
smart camera interacts with, and the possible communications 
within the system. The dotted square refers to the possibility of 
the camera and the phone being in the same network. 
Moreover, the figure illustrates the attack surface and the types 
of attacks on the components. These attackers (A) pose the 
kinds of threats described above. We take ideas for these 
attacks from previous security analysis of devices and 
applications [4, 5]. 
A1. Eavesdropper: When an attacker can monitor 
network traffic and see unencrypted traffic. 
A2. Active attacker on the network: When an attacker 
can use brute force to access user accounts.  
A3. Man in the middle (MITM): When an attacker 
targets improper Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
implementation to route all of the communication 
into his or her station to see the encrypted traffic in 
clear text.  
A4. Man at the end (MATE) 1: When an attacker has 
physical and authorised access to the network on 
which the target under attack resides.  
A5. Man at the end (MATE) 2: When an attacker 
inspects or tampers with the physical device 
hardware or software. 
A6. Remote man at the end (RMATE): When an attacker 
has remote access to the physical device.  
A7. App developers: They may observe user behaviour 
by inserting trackers into the application or by 
inserting malicious code or may leak information.  
A8. Malware developer: Malware can be designed to 
target the associated smart-camera application or 
sensitive data on phone logs and can communicate 
with the camera if they are on the same network. 
A9. The malware can be designed to infect a component 
in the network, which will infect the whole network. 
A10. Third parties: Parties, like Amazon platforms for 
video streaming, web servers, and analytics servers, 
all have an effect on user privacy.  
A11. Wi-Fi Sniffer: When an attacker tries to discover 
router credentials and log in to the network as a 
trusted network component. 
Figure 1 (Smart Camera Environment and Threat Model) 
 
The threat model above suggests a security analysis of the 
smart-camera systems covering five major components of the 
system and attack surface: (1) the security of the transmitted 
video stream; (2) the physical and network security of the 
smart camera device; (3) the security of the associated web 
interface; (4) the vulnerability of the associated mobile 
application to potential information leakage or account  
hijacking; (5) the privacy policy and agreements which the user 
signs up to. 
In each component, the focus will be on one of the 
abovementioned types of threats, albeit each component may 
be affected by more than one type of threat. Communications 
(TH1) exchanged over the Internet are often a big target for 
attackers and can be divulged to the public. These 
communications carry video streams either from the camera to 
the server, the server to the phone, or the camera to the phone 
directly. Smart cameras (TH2) threaten the environment if 
physical security is exposed to an attacker or if its network 
services are open to attackers. Tampering with these devices 
can let the attacker collect substantial information about the 
software running in the camera and its data or access 
unauthorised information remotely.  
The web interface (TH3) is an important part of the system. 
Weak password policies and weak account lockout 
mechanisms can enable an attacker to hijack user accounts and 
compromise user confidentiality and privacy. The Android 
phone application (TH4) is the medium that the user uses to 
interact with the camera, which makes it a potential source of 
vulnerability in the system. Bad application design and 
implementation can leak and expose users’ PII data. A privacy 
(TH4) analysis of the vendor privacy policy can determine 
whether the user’s private data and the location of the user or 
device are being disclosed, further than might be expected. 
Analysis framework 
The Framework analysis components and their respective test 
cases are illustrated in Table 1. The framework will examine 
the security of the smart camera system by following some 
techniques culled mainly from the following sources: security 
analysis of Android applications for analysing the associated 
Android application in the smart camera system [4], OWASP 
testing guides [6, 7], IEEE IoT security best practices [8], 
Network attackers [5, 9], a privacy and security study of smart 
scales [10].  
Component Threat Imposed 
Test Case 
Number Test Case Name Test Case Description 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
TH 1 
Test Case I 
Camera-Server Whether the connection between the camera 
and the server exchanges the video stream. 
Test Case II 
Server-Phone Whether the connection between the server 
and the phone exchanges the video stream. 
Test Case III 
Camera-Phone Whether the connection between the camera 
and the phone exchanges the video stream. 
Test Case IV 
Camera-
Registration server 
Whether the connection between the camera 
and the registration server can be intercepted 
by a man in the middle attack. 
Sm
ar
t C
am
er
a 
TH 2 
Test Case V 
Camera Network 
Services 
Check for open ports, exploitable outdated 
services running on these ports, URLs that 
access system information. Update process. 
Test Case VI 
Camera Default 
Passwords 
Check for the use of default passwords by the 
company manufacturer. 
Test Case VII 
Camera Physical 
Security 
Whether the device physical ports can be 
used to access the camera or insert something 
into it, whether the camera can be put into 
unsafe state, and whether it has a removable 
storage media. 
W
eb
 
In
te
rfa
ce
 
TH 3 
Test Case VIII Weak Password Policy 
Check whether the password policy along 
with account lockout mechanisms can add 
extra layer of security to protect user account 
from hijacking. Test Case IX 
Account Lockout 
Mechanisms 
A
nd
ro
id
 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
TH 4 
Test Case X 
SSL 
Implementation 
Check whether SSL implementation is 
flawed, causing the connection between the 
phone and server to be under risk of a man in 
the middle attack. 
Test Case XI 
Log file 
Information 
Leakage 
Check whether user PII is leaked due to bad 
logging mechanisms by developers. 
Component Threat Imposed 
Test Case 
Number Test Case Name Test Case Description 
Test Case XII 
Over-privileged 
Application 
Check application manifest permissions with 
the application features to check for possible 
backdoors or signs of risky programming. 
Test Case XIII App Signing Check the application signing certificate parameters. 
Table 1 (Framework Test Cases) 
 
Case Studies 
The framework is applied on two types of smart cameras: 
outdoor and indoor cameras. These smart cameras are: 
• The outdoor smart camera product is the Ring 
Doorbell that is used to enable users to hear and speak 
to visitors through their smartphones [11].  
• The indoor smart camera Netatmo Welcome, which 
enables users to monitor their home and recognize 
intruders through the face recognition feature [12]. 
•  The indoor smart camera BT Smart Home Cam 100 
that provides home monitoring through smartphones 
as well [13]. 
We considered three cameras in depth (Ring, Netatmo, BT) 
from the start of the study; a further two were added later and 
they are MA and UA indoor smart cameras. Both have the 
same working mechanisms as the first three cameras with 
having an associated phone application that allow the user to 
control the smart camera by watching the stream and 
recording. We elide full details of those devices because the 
responsibility disclosures are in the process. 
Table 2 summarises the case studies under the framework. The 
table column gives a view of the security issues found for the 
cameras. The row view gives an indication of how each camera 
deals with a certain test case. Three classifications are 
introduced based on the severity of the issues found. Red 
means that the issues are very dangerous and have a huge effect 
on user security and privacy. Yellow means it is a warning, and 
the issues are medium on the severity scale or that it requires 
some certain settings to be considered a red issue. Green 
suggests that no issues were discovered regarding this test case. 
      
Test Case 
Name 
Ring Doorbell 
Smart Camera 
Netatmo 
Welcome Smart 
Camera 
BT Smart Home 
Camera 
MA Smart Home 
Camera 
UA Smart Home 
Camera 
Communication 
Camera-
Server 
Ï RTP 
unencrypted video 
stream. 
! SD card contains 
traces of 
cryptographic keys 
that might affect 
communication. 
P Encrypted over 
TCP. N/A N/A 
Server-Phone 
Ï SRTP 
encrypted with 
bad key 
management. 
Ï Depends on 
application SSL 
implementation 
that is flawed. 
P Encrypted over 
TCP. N/A N/A 
Camera-
Phone N/A 
! HTTP not safe 
against man at the 
end attackers or 
external attackers 
who try Wi-Fi 
discovery. 
N/A 
P Over UDP, no 
footage was 
directly retrievable 
but there might be 
cases that were not 
covered. 
 
P Over UDP, no 
footage was 
directly retrievable 
but there might be 
cases that were not 
covered. 
 
Camera-
Registration 
Server 
P (However, 
before the update, 
the man in the 
middle was 
applicable). 
P Does not accept 
proxy certificate. 
P Does not accept 
proxy certificate. N/A N/A 
      
Test Case 
Name 
Ring Doorbell 
Smart Camera 
Netatmo 
Welcome Smart 
Camera 
BT Smart Home 
Camera 
MA Smart Home 
Camera 
UA Smart Home 
Camera 
Smart Camera 
Camera 
Network 
Services 
PNo unnecessary 
open ports. 
Automated 
updates. 
P No unnecessary 
open ports. 
Automated 
updates. 
Ï Port 53 runs an 
outdated version 
of dnsmasq, 
system logs 
leakage, accessible 
setup page that 
expose router 
credential, user 
intervention 
needed to update. 
Ï An accessible 
page that prompt 
the user a 
password. This 
password can be 
the admin 
password or the 
password that the 
user changed it to. 
 
Ï Accessible 
system log: 
http://IP-
Address/debug/sys
logd.txt, open 
ports (49152/tcp 
unknown- 554/tcp 
rtsp- 80/tcp http). 
 
Camera 
Default 
Passwords 
P Depending on 
the working 
dynamic of the 
camera no use of 
default passwords 
was apparent; as 
far as it was tested 
it seems good. 
P Depending on 
the working 
dynamic of the 
camera no use of 
default passwords 
was apparent; as 
far as it was tested 
it seems good. 
Ï Username = 
"admin"; password 
= "admin". 
Ï Makes use of 
default password 
“admin” that can 
be changed by the 
user but can be 
reset by the device 
reset button to 
“admin”. 
Ï Makes use of 
default password 
“admin” that can 
be changed by the 
user and it cannot 
be reset by the 
device reset 
button. 
Camera 
Physical 
Security 
! Can be put into 
unsafe state, 
exposes MAC 
address and serial 
number of the 
device. 
Ï Removable 
unencrypted media 
storage. 
Ï Can be put into 
unsafe state 
making some 
pages accessible, 
exposes MAC 
address and serial 
number of the 
device. 
!  The SD card is 
not recognizable, 
exposes the ID and 
password of the 
device. 
Ï Removable 
unencrypted media 
storage, exposes 
UID, password 
and serial number 
of the device. 
Web Interface 
Weak 
Password 
Policy ! No password 
complexity 
enforced, there are 
account lockout 
mechanisms. 
PAdequate 
password policy, 
adequate lockout 
mechanisms. 
Ï No password 
complexity 
enforced, no 
account lockout. 
Ï No password 
complexity 
enforced, no 
account lockout. 
!  No password 
complexity 
enforced, (no 
lockout 
mechanisms due to 
the fact that the 
account is 
accessible by the 
phone 
application). 
Account 
Lockout 
Mechanisms 
Android Application 
SSL 
Implementati
on 
P Uses a set of 
certificates defined 
in pem file. 
Ï Flawed SSL 
implementation, 
TLS settings does 
not support the 
current best 
practices. 
Ï Flawed 
certificate 
validation, TLS 
settings do not 
support current 
best practices. 
Ï No SSL is used. 
The user is logged 
in via HTTP. 
N/A doesn’t 
connect to the 
server it 
communicates 
with the camera 
directly using 
UDP. 
Log File 
Information 
Leakage 
Ï User PII 
leakage: home 
address, 
cryptographic 
keys, etc. 
P No leakage 
detected. 
P No leakage 
detected. 
Ï Leaks 
encryption keys, 
Wi-Fi credential. 
P No leakage 
detected. 
      
Test Case 
Name 
Ring Doorbell 
Smart Camera 
Netatmo 
Welcome Smart 
Camera 
BT Smart Home 
Camera 
MA Smart Home 
Camera 
UA Smart Home 
Camera 
Over-
privileged 
Application 
P Reasonably- 
privileged. 
! Semi-privileged  
READ_CONTAC
TS 
WAKE_LOCK 
FINE_LOCATIO
N. 
! Semi-privileged  
READ_CONTAC
TS 
WAKE_LOCK. 
P Reasonably- 
privileged. 
P  Reasonably- 
privileged. 
App Signing P Good certificate parameter. 
Ï Bad certificate 
parameter: 
SHA1WITHRSA. 
Ï Bad certificate 
parameter: 
SHA1WITHRSA. 
Ï Bad certificate 
parameter: 
SHA1WITHRSA. 
Ï Bad certificate 
parameter: 
SHA1WITHRSA. 
Table 2 (Framework Component Applied to Commodity Cameras) 
From Table 2 we can see that many of the security issues 
identified effect user privacy such as unencrypted video 
stream, encrypted video stream with bad key management, 
leakage of user sensitive information and unencrypted 
removable storage that stores user’s videos. The fifth 
component involved privacy policy compliance with the 
OECD principles [14]. Vendors usually dedicate sections to 
their products’ privacy policy. These policies cover data 
collection, data use, data storage, and the security of user data. 
The OECD proposed a set of principles to ensure that user 
privacy is protected with the utmost best practice possible. For 
example, one of the companies excels in the collection 
limitation principle by only collecting relevant information, 
while one of the other companies gathers demographic 
information and other irrelevant information.  
 
Summary of the results 
• Unencrypted video stream. Protocols used in video 
streaming that do not provide any kind of encryption 
need to be abandoned. Alternatively, a more secure 
version of the protocols needs to be used. For 
example, the more secure version, which is the SRTP, 
needs to be used instead of the RTP used on one of 
the investigated cameras.  
• Encrypted video stream with bad key 
management. Protocols used in video streaming that 
do not provide secure key management need to be 
considered while using the protocol. For example, the 
SRTP that exchanges the keys in plaintext in the 
SDP/SIP protocols need secure key management 
using authenticated key establishment (AKE) 
protocols like TLS, IPsec, etc. [15], [16]. Bad key 
management renders the encryption mechanisms 
useless. More efforts are needed to choose the key 
management of the protocol and encryption 
mechanisms used.  
• Video stream unencrypted due to blindly trusting 
internal network. Loose trust boundaries endanger 
the video stream and make it more exposed to risk. 
When the camera and phone reside within the same 
network, they exchange the video in an unencrypted 
way, which means that the camera trusts the network 
on which it operates. Thus, the threats come from two 
entities: the man at the end attacker that has a trust 
relationship with the network or an external attacker 
who can perform Wi-Fi discovery of the router keys 
and can access unencrypted traffic of the video 
stream. Vendors need to tighten the product trust 
boundaries as much as possible and not put the 
product trust on another entity. Especially as the 
assumption that internal WiFi networks are secure is 
unrealistic in shared environments and increasingly 
challenged by vulnerabilities such as the recently 
discovered KRACK key reinstallation attack [17]. 
• Accessible URLs that can access system 
information. During set up, when cameras create an 
access point and the Android application is supposed 
to be connecting to it to perform the setup procedure, 
the vendors need to secure the access point and 
provide an authentication for the device connected to 
it to prevent attackers from impersonating the 
Android application and inferring a lot of information 
about the system through a set of URLs.  
• Default passwords. Default passwords need to be 
considered seriously by vendors because, if an 
attacker knows that a product uses default passwords, 
the number of users who will be affected will be huge. 
Consequently, vendors need to be contacted to change 
these default passwords and limit attacker 
accessibility to these accounts.  
• Video exposure through unencrypted removable 
physical storage. When the camera uses an external 
removable storage, the content of the removable 
storage needs to be protected, for example, to let the 
SD card be password protected or to encrypt its 
content or make the SD card write-protected to 
protect its content from being altered or deleted. 
Moreover, access control rules need to be applied to 
removable data storage [18]. 
• Weak password policy and No account lockout. 
Strong password policies along with strong lockout 
mechanisms need to be applied by vendors to ensure 
that user accounts are safe from hijacking and that 
accounts are safeguarded against brute-force attacks.  
• Improper SSL implementation. Bad SSL 
implementation needs to be patched by application 
developers. The code needs to be modified to not trust 
all certificates. This bad implementation exposes user 
to being a victim of man in the middle attacks. 
Certificate pinning needs to be implemented by 
application developers following available guidelines 
provided by Moxie Marlinspike, the former head of 
security at Twitter and the founder of Open Whisper 
Systems, [19] to eliminate any chances of being 
vulnerable to a man in the middle attack.  
• Sensitive information leakage through phone logs. 
Developers need to prepare the application for release 
and remove the unnecessary logging information used 
for debugging, like user sensitive information or 
cryptographic keys.  
• Over-privileged application. Developers need to ask 
for the minimum permissions required, which enables 
the app to conduct its own tasks without requesting 
unused or unneeded permissions.  
• Bad certificate parameter. Developers need to 
generate or request certificates that use more secure 
parameters and comply with the latest safe certificate 
settings.  
Discussion 
The range of vulnerabilities discovered based on the proposed 
threat model and the smart-camera framework on five cameras 
indicate the strength of the analytical framework components 
and the corresponding test cases. Table 3 gives a general 
overview of the smart-camera analysis framework with the 
vulnerabilities successfully discovered.  
A responsible disclosure has been followed to inform the 
companies about the vulnerabilities discovered in their 
products. Some vendors accepted direct email reports, others 
asked us to submit information via shared bug bounty 
programmes. Some of the companies asked for a more detailed 
Proof of Concept (PoC) to investigate the security flaws. one 
of the vulnerabilities was due to the device capabilities that 
limited it from being able to prevent the vulnerability from 
existing. Some of the vulnerabilities were known by the 
vendors and they were in the fix mode and some of them were 
new.  
     
Component Threat Imposed 
Test 
Case 
Number 
Test Case 
Name Vulnerabilities Discovered 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
TH 1 
Test 
Case I Camera-Server Unencrypted video stream 
Test 
Case II Server-Phone Encrypted video stream with bad key management 
Test 
Case III Camera-Phone 
Loose trust boundaries endanger the video stream to internal 
and external attackers 
Test 
Case IV 
Camera-
Registration 
Server 
Launching man in the middle attack * (the vulnerability was 
launched before firmware update) 
Sm
ar
t C
am
er
a 
TH 2 
Test 
Case V 
Camera 
Network 
Services 
Open port that runs outdated version of dnsmasq, accessible 
webpages that expose system information (log, Wi-Fi 
credentials) 
Test 
Case VI 
Camera Default 
Passwords 
The use of default credential with username = ‘admin’; 
password = ‘admin’ during setup 
Test 
Case VII 
Camera 
Physical 
Security 
User videos exposed through the external removable storage, 
devices can be put into unsecure state 
W
eb
 In
te
rfa
ce
 
TH 3 
Test 
Case 
VIII 
Weak Password 
Policy 
No password policy and no account lockout mechanisms 
Test 
Case IX 
Account 
Lockout 
Mechanisms 
A
nd
ro
id
 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n  
TH 4 
Test 
Case X 
SSL 
Implementation 
Flawed SSL implementation that caused video stream exposer 
and enabled man in the middle attacks 
Test 
Case XI 
Log File 
Information 
Leakage 
User PII is leaked due to bad logging mechanisms by 
developers 
Test 
Case XII 
Over-privileged 
Application Over-privileged application that uses unnecessary permissions 
Test 
Case 
XIII 
App Signing Application developer signing certificate parameter with hash algorithm that has collision problems 
Table 3 (Framework and Test Cases Evaluation) 
A. Related work 
A lot of efforts in the last few years have been focused on 
outlining security and privacy guidelines on Internet of things. 
In February 2015 “Five Star Automotive Cyber Safety 
Framework” was proposed [20]. Following that in May 2015 
the code of conduct for IoT designers and developers to help 
produce more secure products was designed [21]. In January 
of 2016 security and privacy guidelines were proposed for 
Connected Medical Devices [22]. GSM Alliance created their 
IoT guidelines in February of 2016 [23]. Following after that 
many security and privacy guidelines in the year of 2016 had 
been proposed: the OWASP security guidelines [6], [24] by 
OneM2M, [25] by Broadband Internet Technical Advisory 
Group, [26] by the US Department of Homeland Security, [27] 
and [28] by Industrial Internet Consortium. In 2017 the IoT 
Security & Privacy Trust Framework by the Online Trust 
Alliance was proposed [29]. These guidelines go over the same 
material of the kinds of vulnerabilities that can be encountered 
in an IoT device [30].  
Researchers began to create frameworks for analysing 
these kinds of vulnerabilities in IoT. The work of Tekeoglu et 
al. in [31] suggested a test bed to analyse the security and 
privacy of IoT devices. Their testing environment was based 
on creating two access points, one to connect all the devices to 
it and the other one to connect the phone to it and by making 
use of Kali Linux operating system and its pre-installed tools 
captured all the traffic generated from the IoT devices. They 
used their testbed in examining a set of commercial IoT 
devices like IP cameras, drones, activity trackers and 
smartwatches. However, their work was more focused on the 
testbed setting without providing a methodological way of 
examining the devices. Dhanjani in [32] carried out specific 
kinds of attacks on specific kinds of IoT devices such as 
exploiting Default credential in Foscam and SSL certificate 
validation in SmartThings etc. Their discussions provide 
details on certain types of attack that could or could not 
necessarily work on other devices. Tekeoglu et al. in [33] 
investigated the security and privacy of NetCam camera and 
went into great depth to focus on specific attacks against that 
camera but their investigation was limited to one kind of 
camera. We find that the work in this field is either too general, 
i.e., the security and privacy guidelines provide a general 
overview of the kinds of vulnerabilities that should be avoided 
or too specific, i.e., the researchers focused on discovering 
vulnerabilities in specific IoT devices leading to no 
generalizations. Therefore, our work aims in the middle and 
provides a framework for analysing security cameras and 
provides test cases that might be generalized to any IoT device 
that has the same working mechanisms.  
Conclusions and Future Work 
Prior work in the IoT field is either too generic [34] or too 
specific to the kind of IoT or the brand of IoT device [32]. 
Alternatively, it focuses on aspects of IoT and leaves other 
aspects [35]. Since it is an active area of research and since 
guidelines are still under development [6, 8] and several more, 
there is no guide for the analysis framework for smart cameras 
for domestic use.   
Our work has provided an analysis framework for 
future studies for assessing domestic smart cameras. The 
analysis framework can be generalised to other kinds of IoT 
devices and can be used by security experts to analyse products 
or by vendors to prevent security breaches from vulnerabilities. 
The trivial kinds of vulnerabilities found, such as unencrypted 
video stream, removable unencrypted storage media, 
applications with flawed SSL implementation, leakage of PII 
user data, and so on, emphasise the need for this kind of 
research and the need to spread awareness about security 
among vendors.  
The kinds of breaches discovered by this paper are 
sufficient indicators that security is not a priority for vendors. 
The way that products are advertised gives the impression that 
they ensure security and protect user privacy. Moreover, the 
frequently asked questions section does not often reflect what 
happens behind the scenes with the products in general. This 
emphasises the need for such security analysis to better secure 
such devices and protect users’ privacy, and the need to 
provide independent kite- marking or similar to certify that 
device has passed tests. 
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